In this paper, I analyze William Crathorn’s view on extension and compare it to William Ockham’s reductionist view, according to which extension is not really distinct from substance or quality. In my view, Crathorn elaborates a metaphysical machinery based on mereological and topological relationships in order to solve what he considers to be problems in Ockham’s account of quantity. In order to make my point, I reconstruct Crathorn’s main arguments in favor of his finitist atomism. Crathorn claims that certain fundamental (...) spatial structures are of a mereological nature and that the mereological properties of located entities perfectly match those of their locations. This idea lies at the core of his solution to the paradox of touching and the metrical paradox. It allows him to redefine contiguity in such a way that extensionless magnitudes can touch and succeed each other. Crathorn goes one step further and claims that indivisibles are extended in the sense that they occupy an extended incorporeal space, which is their dimension. In this sense, they can come together to form a continuous magnitude. Thus, Crathorn succeeds in defining a concept of continuity that is compatible with his finitist atomism and that addresses what he takes to be a major weakness in Ockham’s view on extension, namely a murky concept of impenetrability. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the debate between William of Ockham and his contemporary Peter Auriol on how to account for the intension and remission of forms. Peter Auriol denies that an added degree of a quality such as the theological virtue of charity could be anything other than something which is neither a universal nor an individual and which cannot be grasped by intuition, but must be posited in order to account for the possibility that an accidental form can vary (...) in intensity. Ockham aims at proving that Auriol’s account is inconsistent. In my opinion, Ockham does not succeed, nor does he succeed in defending a consistent account of the metaphysics underlying the intension and remission of forms. Indeed, he conceives of the degree of a quality as a part of the intensified quality which, while being an individual that is really distinct from the quality and can be picked out, forms a unity with it in such a way that the union of the degree and the quality is itself an individual. Ockham fails to distinguish the notion of maximal resemblance holding between a quality’s degree and the quality from the notion of maximal resemblance which holds between individuals of the same species. In the end, he is led to give up the idea that a degree is an individual that can be picked out in order to protect the core thesis of his nominalism about universals. (shrink)

English summary: This book attests that a study on the history of philosophy has its place in contemporary debates. This book attempts to reconstruct William of Ockham's position on the nature and function of real definitions in order to show that nominalism does not oblige a particular position on essences. French description: Guillaume d'Ockham, defenseur bien connu du nominalisme, a manifeste un interet soutenu pour les definitions reelles. Cet ouvrage s'efforce de reconstruire sa position sur la nature et la fonction (...) des definitions reelles. Un examen de ce qu'est une definition reelle appelle une etude de ce qu'est une essence et de la nature du lien a poser entre l'essentiel et le necessaire. Cet ouvrage a pour objectif de montrer que le nominalisme ne contraint pas a une position determinee sur les essences. Saul Kripke nous dit que l'essentiel se reduit au necessaire. Kit Fine, par contre, affirme qu'il faut revenir a Aristote et soutenir que l'essentiel est irreductible au necessaire. Notre examen atteste qu'une etude en histoire de la philosophie a toute sa place dans les debats contemporains. L'essentialisme de Guillaume d'Ockham incite a rendre a Aristote ce qui lui revient et a faire preuve de circonspection. En definitive, les deux positions en presence ne sont peut-etre pas incompatibles. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to reconstruct Ockham’s semantics of the categories in order to prove first that his semantics is consistent. Second, Ockham is not skeptical about the possibility to derive the categories from primitives. According to Ockham, one must accept two principles in order to derive the categories. The first is the principle of ‘in quid’ predication, according to which a name of category can be predicated ‘in quid’ of a determined class of terms. The second is the (...) principle of the transitivity of predication, according to which A is predicated of C if A is predicated of B and B is predicated of C. I will show that Ockham’s semantics of the categories makes two assumptions. According to the first assumption, there exist only two types of things, substances and qualities. According to the second, the categories are mutually exclusive. Ockham’s semantics of the categories implies that the categories are both ontological and conceptual and that it is not possible to prove that there is a determined number of categories. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophers have investigated how change works. If a thing moves from one state to another, when exactly does it start to be in its new state, and when does it cease to be in its former one? In the late Middle Ages, the "problem of the instant of change" was subject to considerable debate and gave rise to sophisticated theories; it became popular and controversial again in the second half of the twentieth century. The studies collected here constitute (...) the first attempt at tackling the different aspects of an issue that, until now have been the object of seminal but isolated forays. They do so in through a historical perspective, offering both the medieval and the contemporary viewpoints. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to William of Ockham’s theory of habit, which he considers to be a disposition of a power of the soul. I will argue that Ockham’s view on the relation between a habit and its manifestation sheds new light on his well-known thesis that sensible and intelligible species are not needed to account for cognition. The identity conditions of habits are themselves the ground of their intentionality: there is no way to track a habit from an act (...) of a given kind except by stipulating a causal relation between them. In this sense, a study of Ockham’s theory of habit is a step towards our understanding of the relation between similarity and causation in his theory of intentionality. Ockham’s theory of habit accommodates intentional phenomena that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, are not ipso facto semantic phenomena. (shrink)

This book features 20 essays that explore how Latin medieval philosophers and theologians from Anselm to Buridan conceived of habitus, as well as detailed studies of the use of the concept by Augustine and of the reception of the medieval doctrines of habitus in Suàrez and Descartes. Habitus are defined as stable dispositions to act or think in a certain way. This definition was passed down to the medieval thinkers from Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, Augustine, and played a (...) key role in many of the philosophical and theological developments of the time. Written by leading experts in medieval and modern philosophy, the book offers a historical overview that examines the topic in light of recent advances in medieval cognitive psychology and medieval moral theory. Coverage includes such topics as the metaphysics of the soul, the definition of virtue and vice, and the epistemology of self-knowledge. The book also contains an introduction that is the first attempt at a comprehensive survey of the nature and function of habitus in medieval thought. The material will appeal to a wide audience of historians of philosophy and contemporary philosophers. It is relevant as much to the historian of ancient philosophy who wants to track the historical reception of Aristotelian ideas as it is to historians of modern philosophy who would like to study the progressive disappearance of the term “habitus” in the early modern period and the concepts that were substituted for it. In addition, the volume will also be of interest to contemporary philosophers open to historical perspectives in order to renew current trends in cognitive psychology, virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

Ockham’s approach to the problem of the instant of change as it is found in the Summa logicae i, chapter 5, and ii, chapter 19, is usually described as “purely logical,” narrowing the treatment of “begins” and “ceases” to simplistic cases. The aim of this paper is to complement our knowledge of Ockham’s position on the problem of the instant of change by analysing the treatment of the problem he gives in his questions on the Physics 98-101. In these passages, (...) Ockham adopts a “physical approach” in order to deal with problems related to the continuity of alteration and the production of the form of the mix from elementary qualities. To solve these problems, he is compelled to give up one of the most important claims at the basis of the logical approach that he adopted in the Summa logicae, namely that the distinction between permanent and successive entities is not relevant in the assignment of truth-conditions to propositions containing the aspectual verbs “beginning” and “ceasing.”. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la nature et de la fonction du principe d’économie tel qu’il est formulé et employé par Guillaume d’Ockham. Je défends l’idée que le principe d’économie tel qu’il est employé par Guillaume d’Ockham peut être compris comme un précepte méthodologique à suivre pour procéder à une inférence vers la meilleure explication. Je me propose donc de répondre aux deux questions suivantes. En quoi un argument d’économie consiste-t-il et quelle est (...) sa valeur explicative? Quel rapport établit-il entre la théorie adoptée et les faits? Pour défendre ma thèse, je procéderai en deux parties principales. Je commencerai par présenter... (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to examine the conception of metaphor developed by fourteenth-century nominalist philosophers, in particular William of Ockham and John Buridan, but also the Ockhamist philosophers who were condemned by the 1340 statute of the faculty of arts of the University of Paris. According to these philosophers, metaphor is a transfer of meaning from one word to another. This transfer is based on some similarity, and is intentionally produced by a speaker. My aim is to study whether (...) this view on metaphor is related to a specific view on the relation between thought, language, and communication. With this case study, I intend to argue that the view on the nature of thought one holds does not necessarily determine what the nature and function of metaphor are. I will show that the three philosophical doctrines under study diverge in their understanding of the mechanisms of a metaphor, while they share the same view on the nature of thought, namely that thought is a mental language. (shrink)

Cet article traite d’un cas particulier dans la métaphysique de la relation de Guillaume d’Ockham, à savoir la relation de composition entre la matière et la forme substantielle. Le cas théologique du triduum mortis soulève un problème pour les métaphysiques réductionnistes de la relation comme celle d’Ockham. Ce dernier peut-il en rendre compte sans accepter que certaines relations soient irréductibles à leurs relata? Le point de départ de l’article est l’interprétation communément partagée sur la théorie de la relation d’Ockham. Je (...) m’en sépare pour soutenir l’idée que, même si Ockham affirme que la distinction entre chose et mode d’être est inintelligible dans la plupart des cas, il pourrait avoir reconnu l’existence d’au moins un type de mode dans son ontologie. (shrink)

This paper argues that, for Ockham, the parts of the continuum exist in act in the continuum: they are already there before any division of the continuum. Yet, they are infinitely many in that no division of the continuum will exhaust all the existing parts of the continuum taken conjointly. This reading of Ockham takes into account the crucial place of his new concept of the infinite in his analysis of the infinite divisibility of the continuum. Like many of his (...) fellow anti-atomists, Ockham stresses that the concept of a potential infinite seems to contradict Aristotle’s modal logic, in particular the central assumption that there is no potency that will never be realized. Ockham, like other fourteenth-century anti-atomists, tried not only to refute atomism, but also to propose an analysis of the infinite divisibility of the continuum that is not incompatible with their modal logic. (shrink)

This edited volume presents new lines of research dealing with the language of thought and its philosophical implications in the time of Ockham. It features more than 20 essays that also serve as a tribute to the ground-breaking work of a leading expert in late medieval philosophy: Claude Panaccio. Coverage addresses topics in the philosophy of mind and cognition (externalism, mental causation, resemblance, habits, sensory awareness, the psychology, illusion, representationalism), concepts (universal, transcendental, identity, syncategorematic), logic and language (definitions, syllogisms, modality, (...) supposition, obligationes, et cetera), action theory (belief, will, action), and more. A distinctive feature of this work is that it brings together contributions in both French and English, the two major research languages today on the main theme in question. It unites the most renowned specialists in the field as well as many of Claude Panaccio's former students who have engaged with his work over the years. In furthering this dialogue, the essays render key topics in fourteenth-century thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical community without being anachronistic or insensitive to the particularities of the medieval context. As a result, this book will appeal to a general population of philosophers and historians of philosophy with an interest in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Ockham’s ontology of arithmetic, specifically his position on the ontological status of natural numbers, has not yet attracted the attention of scholars. Yet it occupies a central role in his nominalism; specifically, Ockham’s position on numbers constitutes a third part of his ontological reductionism, alongside his doctrines of universals and the categories, which have long been recognized to constitute the first two parts. That is, the first part of this program claims that the very idea of a universal thing is (...) self-contradictory, while the second part asserts that it is more rational to accept only two distinct types of singular things, namely substance and quality. These two elements are incomplete, however, for they do not fully encompass Ockham’s position on what realists take to be abstract objects. For this, one needs the third part of Ockham’s program of ontological reductionism, dealing with numbers, among the most paradigmatic abstract objects for realists. (shrink)

This edited volume presents new lines of research dealing with the language of thought and its philosophical implications in the time of Ockham. It features more than 20 essays that also serve as a tribute to the ground-breaking work of a leading expert in late medieval philosophy: Claude Panaccio. Coverage addresses topics in the philosophy of mind and cognition, concepts, logic and language, action theory, and more. A distinctive feature of this work is that it brings together contributions in both (...) French and English, the two major research languages today on the main theme in question. It unites the most renowned specialists in the field as well as many of Claude Panaccio’s former students who have engaged with his work over the years. In furthering this dialogue, the essays render key topics in fourteenth-century thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical community without being anachronistic or insensitive to the particularities of the medieval context. As a result, this book will appeal to a general population of philosophers and historians of philosophy with an interest in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, Volume 62, Issue, Page 380-387, January 2020.

Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, Volume 62, Issue, Page 380-387, January 2020.

This chapter consists of a systematic introduction to the nature and function of habitus in Latin medieval philosophy. Over the course of this introduction, several topics are treated: the theoretical necessity to posit habitus; their nature; their causal contribution to the production of internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes their unity when they can have multiple objects and work in clusters. Finally, we examine two specific questions: why intellectual habitus represent a special (...) case that triggered considerable debate; how human beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus. (shrink)

In this short but dense monograph, Roques sets out to fill a significant lacuna in the literature on William of Ockham's logic, epistemology, and metaphysics: his theory of real definitions. Remarkably, the subject has received little attention, given that nominal definitions, specifically in connection to complex connotative concepts in mental language and their role in Ockham's ontological reductionism, have been a central focus since the early 1980s. One reason for this oversight may be the historical association between real definitions (...) and the realist view that essences are universal entities. Ockham, a resemblance nominalist, holds that all essences are individual entities; this does not, as Roques's present... (shrink)

This anthology concerns limit-decision problems, chiefly as treated in the fourteenth-century Latin West. A central problem taken up concerns the instant of change: in a change from ø to not-ø such that before instant t there is ø and after t not-ø, at t is there ø, or not-ø, or neither, or both? For medieval thinkers, the answer often depended on what kind of item was at issue. They standardly distinguished permanent items, the whole of which exists simultaneously, from successive (...) items, whose parts are non-simultaneous, and gave different type or type answers in the two cases.The papers in... (shrink)

It is widely accepted that consent is a normative power. For instance, consent can make an impermissible act permissible. In the words of Heidi Hurd, it “turns a trespass into a dinner party... an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment.” In this chapter, I argue against the assumption that consent has such robust powers for moral transformation. In particular, I argue that there is a wide range of sex that harms or wrongs victims despite being consensual. Moreover, these cases (...) are not limited to those where con- sent is vitiated by background conditions. I start by calling this category of consensual sex Bad Sex. I then distinguish subspecies of this category, including psychological pressure, social coercion, and epistemically unsafe sex. I end by responding to an objection on which we should treat at least some subspecies of Bad Sex as rape. Though this alternative proposal is often motivated by ameliorative and strategic considerations, I argue that such considerations actually count against collapsing the categories of Bad Sex and rape. (shrink)

When we think about agents who change a long-standing belief, we sometimes have conflicting reactions. On the one hand, such agents often epistemically improve. For example, their new belief may be better supported by the evidence or closer to the truth. On the other hand, such agents are often subject to criticism. Examples include politicians who change their minds on whether climate change is occurring or whether vaccines cause autism. What explains this criticism, and is it ever justified? To answer (...) these questions, I introduce the notion of epistemic atonement. By epistemic atonement, I mean the process of making up for one’s previous epistemic failures, including believing badly. Central to my account is the idea that epistemic atonement requires restoring trust and indicating trustworthiness. I flesh out my proposal by drawing on philosophical and empirical literature on apologies, demonstrating that epistemic blame and atonement parallels the moral domain in various under-appreciated respects. (shrink)

Apart from references to perception, words such as see and listen have shared, non-literal meanings across diverse languages. Such cross-linguistic meanings have not been systematically investigated as they appear in their natural home — informal spoken interaction. We present a qualitative examination of the semantic associations of perception verbs based on recorded everyday conversation in thirteen diverse languages. Across these diverse communities, spontaneous interaction provides evidence for two commonly-discussed extensions of perception verbs — perception~cognition, hearing~linguistic communication — as well as (...) illustrating other meanings and functions that have been less appreciated heretofore. The range of usage that is readily observable in informal conversation makes it clear that this type of data must take center stage for the empirically grounded study of semantics. Moreover, these data suggest that commonalities in polysemous meanings may rely not only on universal cognition, but also on the universal exigencies of social interaction. (shrink)

Cet article porte un regard sur les temporalités et les territorialités nocturnes des pratiques et des usages quotidiens à l’île de la Réunion. Peu d’études en sciences sociales ont jusqu’alors réussi à s’extraire des grandes métropoles du Nord pour décentrer leur regard et s’intéresser aux nuits des espaces urbains tropicaux. Dans cette perspective, l’une des tâches de fond consiste à étudier la place de l’obscurité dans le vécu et l’imaginaire des populations réunionnaises, gageant qu’une meilleure connaissance et compréhension des territorialités (...) nocturnes pourrait aider à consolider les démarches de protection de l’environnement nocturne dans le quotidien de l’aménagement des territoires. L’île a vu depuis plusieurs décennies ses campagnes se transformer profondément, pour certaines très marquées par l’exode, pour d’autres avalées dans un processus d’urbanisation non maîtrisé. C’est dans ce contexte que notre équipe a commencé à installer, en partenariat avec le Parc national de... (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objetivo revisar y cuestionar algunos conceptos tradicionales cuando se aborda la temática de las personas adultas mayores, con la finalidad de analizar de manera cronológica y desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos, la normatividad legal que dispuso y prorrogó la cuarentena focalizada en tiempos 1de pandemia a causa del COVID-19. Sustentando que las medidas legales adoptadas fueron discriminatorias por razón de edad, no sólo significando la privación del derecho a la libertad de tránsito, sino que (...) además afectó otros derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales. Finalmente se presenta las voces de algunas personas mayores que manifiestan su percepción sobre el tema. (shrink)

Kermani traces the history of mankind from the origins of society and language to the present, and un-mutes the silence that resulted from the moment man began to write his history instead of listening to history's story.

Pourquoi la colère selon Platon ? S'évader d'une perspective classique qui présente tout excès comme étant mauvais, telle est la tentative de cette étude de la colère selon Platon.

'Comparative Philosophy without Borders' consists of nine essays and puts forth an extensive methodology for a redefined comparative philosophy, as presented in the Introduction and Afterword/Afterwards written by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber. The nine essays by Tom J. F. Tillemans, Barry Hallen, Chien-hsing Ho, Laurie L. Patton, Arindam Chakrabarti, Masato Ishida, Ralph Weber, Sari Nusseibeh and Sor-hoon Tan draw on various philosophical traditions, academic fields and topics, in order to effectuate what ‘Comparative Philosophy Without Borders’ could be. The clear (...) aim of these essays is to demonstrate and put into practice the methodology presented by the two editors and authors, according to whom performing comparative philosophy transcends establishing it through norms. This definitely constitutes a successfully treated challenge, not only by the authors, but even more by the editors. (shrink)

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm with the general theory of justice. Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” (...) Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes. (shrink)

Interseções e interações entre mídia, religião e mercado: um objeto dinâmico e instigante (Intersections and interactions between media, religion and market: a dynamic object and thought-provoking) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2014v12n34p284 Editorial - Dossiê: Religião, Mercado e Mídia.

La multiplication sur Internet des dispositifs « interactifs » interroge les enjeux et les principes des nouvelles formes de communication qui envahissent les systèmes techniques contemporains. La banalisation et la généralisation de ces agencements machiniques remettent en question les frontières traditionnelles entre l’image et le réel, le regard et l’écran, le sens et le message, le sujet et le monde, le public et le privé, le pouvoir et la captation, la présence et l’absence, le désir et le manque...The increasing number (...) of « interactive » devices on Internet addresses the question of the stakes and principles linked to the new forms of communication invading contemporary technical systems. The trivialization and extension of these tools are a challenge to the standard boundary line between images and reality, the viewer and the screen, meaning and message, the individual and the world, the public and private spheres, power and addiction, presence and absence, desire and need.. (shrink)

Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can deny the (...) ignorance norm, on which agents are not permitted to both know and have interrogative attitudes, such as wondering. I argue that there are compelling reasons to deny the former and reasons to question the latter. Both options pave the way for further work on further inquiry. (shrink)

Can you rationally double-check what you already know? In this paper, I argue that you can. Agents can know that something is true and rationally double-check it at the very same time. I defend my position by considering a wide variety of cases where agents double-check their beliefs to gain epistemic improvements beyond knowledge. These include certainty, epistemic resilience, and sensitivity to error. Although this phenomenon is widespread, my proposal faces two types of challenges. First, some have defended ignorance norms, (...) on which agents are only allowed to inquire about things they don’t already know. Second—motivated by strong conceptions of belief or pragmatic encroachment—some have argued that doublechecking destroys knowledge. I argue that these competing views fail to capture both the epistemic value of double-checking and the many reasons why agents might double-check. Moreover, they rely on overly strong assumptions about what inquiry, knowledge, or belief requires. Finally, I marshal linguistic data in favor of the compatibility of knowledge and doublechecking. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This paper analyzes how national institutional factors affect the adoption of the international environmental management standard ISO 14001, using a panel of 139 countries from 1996 to 2006. The analysis emphasizes that during the emerging phase of the standard, the potential lack of consensus within the constituents of the national institutional environment concerning the value of a new standard could send mixed signals to firms about the standard. The results show that in the early phase of adoption, regulative and normative (...) forces within the institutional environment can work against each other. Results also show that regulative or coercive forces play a relatively more important role in the early phase of adoption of the standard than in the subsequent phases of diffusion. In the later phases of diffusion of ISO 14001, normative forces, such as the diffusion of other management standards, as well as factors related to trade, play a more important role. Because of the similarities between environmental management standards and corporate social responsibility standards, this study can help identify some of the challenges for diffusion of ISO management standards in the area of social responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

(2013). Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27-53. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713177.

Com razão se costuma dizer que um problema bem posto é problema meio resolvido E o contrário também é verdade Ora, definir bem um termo tem grande analogia com pôr bem um problema- a correcta definição dos termos que usamos é condição indispensável para a adequada abordagem e debate de qualquer tema A ponto de Jaime Balmes ter podido dizer, com alguma dose de optimismo- si definimos no discutiremos Bem o sabiam os escolásticos, que por esse motivo faziam preceder qualquer (...) disputa pela fase ad terminos, na qual todos os termos que iriam utilizar eram cuidadosamente definidos A história da Ética dá-nos a conhecer alguns casos confirmativos, verdadeiramente exemplares, tanto da importância das definições exactas como das consequências negativas e dificuldades levantadas pelas formulações incorrectas Dois desses exemplos serão aqui lembrados- os dos problemas com que os moralistas se tiveram de confrontar em consequência das deficientes definições de mentira e mutilação A definição de mentira que vigorou durante séculos no mundo ocidental foi a que propôs S Agostinho, primeiro e quase único autor da Antiguidade a estudar desenvolvidamente o tema Este apaixonado pela verdade preocupou-se seriamente com a mentira, e não apenas por ela ser o oposto da verdade- também porque a sua própria concepção de mentira e, consequentemente, a definição que dela propôs, não se lhe apresentava isenta de dificuldades. (shrink)